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Additive manufacturing (AM) has been proven to provide multiple benefits over 
traditional manufacturing methods including cost-savings, mission adaptability, and 
increased unit capabilities. Multiple Department of Defense (DOD) organizations are 
exploring and utilizing AM technology, and efforts are ongoing to determine how best to 
achieve large-scale adoption of AM in the U.S. Navy (USN). The primary concern that 
must be addressed is the trustworthiness of AM objects to ensure they will not increase 
risks to personnel, equipment, and systems. Including cybersecurity throughout the AM 
life cycle is a necessary component of protecting AM data and ensuring trust in AM 
objects to support adoption. This thesis reviews aspects of cybersecurity domain as it is 
applied to AM, and discusses the insights of a survey conducted with USN, U.S. Army 
(USA), and U.S. Air Force (USAF) resident NPS students. The goal of the survey was to 
contrast current understanding of adoption of technology and cybersecurity threats in 
AM, with the knowledge, attitudes, and opinions that prospective users have. The thesis 
identifies barriers to achieve large-scale adoption of AM in the naval domain with special 
emphasis on cybersecurity, and proposes approaches to address those barriers and support 
accelerated adoption of AM.  
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A. RESEARCH DOMAIN 
The growth and development of technologies such as virtual reality (VR), Internet 
of things (IOT), and additive manufacturing (AM), commonly referred to as three-
dimensional (3D) printing, has blurred the lines between the cyber and physical worlds to 
the point that they are now inseparable. This codependent cyber-physical relationship 
creates endless possibilities for advances throughout the world, but it also results in an 
increased need to protect people from additional threats that can use the bridge from 
cyber to physical to cause harm to people and property at potentially life-threatening 
levels.  
On the surface, cybersecurity measures are implemented to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of physical IT resources, such as 
computers and network devices, and digital data, such as files and software. However, 
files, software, networks, computers, and all IT exists because of the tremendous 
capabilities those things provide to people. Even the Internet, which is one of the best 
examples of large-scale adoption of technology, exists because its founders wanted to 
develop a way of social interaction enabled by networking (Leiner et al., 2009). They 
wanted to provide people with a global interconnection that facilitated quick access to 
data and programs by getting computers to talk to each other (Leiner et al., 2009).  
Today, computers allow us to communicate across great distances extremely 
quickly, store and manage incredible amounts of data, and control resources and 
processes that we depend on in our daily lives. However, pulling the string on any 
cybersecurity measure will result in the realization that cybersecurity is fundamentally 
about protecting people. Whether cybersecurity measures are implemented to protect 
critical infrastructure, financial transactions, databases containing personally identifiable 
information (PII) or any other cyber-enabled capability, the root goal of cybersecurity 
measures are to protect people from harm.  
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Cyber presents a constantly evolving threat that allows small adversaries to pose a 
threat with targeted attacks that could not be achieved in other warfare domains. A recent 
example that shows the extremely quick and far reaching damage of a cyber-physical 
threat is the WannaCry ransomware attack that started in May 2017. The malware 
infected more than 300,000 computers in over 150 countries in approximately 72 hours 
(Chappell, 2017). The cyber impact came in the form of affected users being unable to 
access computers and files, but the impact was also felt in the users’ physical lives as 
they were financially extorted for a payment of $300 to restore their files. Additionally, 
the malware impacted a wide range of businesses and public services including hospitals, 
police stations, and educational institutions (Chappell, 2017).  
The cyber-physical threat is also a reality when applied to the field of AM. The 
AM process that creates a physical object relies on a wide variety of cyber capabilities 
and structures. For example, if the digital model that the printer relies on has not been 
properly protected from creation through final printing, then multiple opportunities exist 
for modification of the model. Minor modifications, which may go undetected, can cause 
major failures in the final 3D printed object. If that object is being relied upon for a 
mission-critical purpose, its failure could cripple the units’ war-fighting capabilities. In 
order to take full advantage of the benefits of AM technology, the U.S. Navy (USN) must 
prioritize cybersecurity in all phases of development, adoption, and implementation of 
the Naval AM capability. 
As AM technology continues to rapidly advance, the areas for application of that 
technology within the DOD continue to grow as well, as shown in Figure 1, and 
government organizations such as the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have taken a vested interest in this 
domain (McNulty, Arnas, & Campbell, 2012). 
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Figure 1.  Potential AM Implications for DOD. 
Source: McNulty et al. (2012). 
AM can be a true game changing innovation but it also would not be the first 
technology to start with a great idea that fails to reach realization. Large-scale adoption of 
AM in the Naval domain depends on a well-executed plan that balances usability, 
capability, and security. Within the Navy, AM can provide a great deal of independence 
for deployed units by drastically reducing reliance on the Navy’s supply chain and 
providing much quicker access to physical parts that are needed for normal operation. 
Additionally, it is widely recognized that AM has a potential to save resources by 
consuming less material and limiting overproduction issues experienced in traditional 
manufacturing. Figure 2 shows how AM may also speed productivity by reducing time 
spent waiting on delivery and decrease storage requirements by limiting the amount of 
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specific use items that need to be kept in inventory (Thomas & Gilbert, 2014). Perhaps 
the most unique benefit that AM has over traditional manufacturing is that it provides its 
users with the capability to prototype and make physical artifacts that did not exist 
before. 
 
Figure 2.  Example of Traditional Supply Chain Compared to the 
Supply Chain for AM with Localized Production. 
Source: Thomas and Gilbert (2014). 
As the Navy increases its AM capabilities and expands implementation of this 
cost saving technology, the need to ensure that the data that the AM process creates and 
relies on is secure increases as well. AM presents the realistic potential for deployed 
Strike Groups and individual units to be able to 3D print critical parts and supplies 
without having to utilize the potentially time consuming and costly supply chain. 
However, those units need to have confidence that the part they are fabricating is going to 
fit and work correctly.  
AM has the potential to help the Navy reach new levels of independence from 
current logistics restraints while saving valuable resources including time, manpower, 
and money, but failure to implement AM technology with effective, user-focused, 
cybersecurity principles could result in wasted resources and increased vulnerability to 
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cyber threats. Additionally, the threat of cyber attacks could be a barrier to large-scale 
adoption efforts if decision makers are hesitant to support the technology out of fear that 
it may not be safe from cyber attacks, and individual service members choose not to use 
AM technology because they do not trust the AM product will perform as intended due to 
possible cyber attacks. Much research has been done to identify barriers to the adoption 
of technology and the goal of this thesis is to apply those concepts to the capabilities of 
AM as they are applied to Naval domain to arrive at recommendations at how to achieve 
maximum use of the technology without sacrificing cybersecurity. 
B. MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
In his May 17, 2017, white paper titled The Future Navy, the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) Admiral John M. Richardson states that numerous studies exploring 
what the future USN Fleet should look like led to two main conclusions. First, the fleet 
needs to increase in size to 350 ships, including manned and unmanned systems. 
Currently, there are approximately 275 USN vessels so that represents a 21% increase 
while enduring a challenging fiscal environment and budget constraints. Figure 3 
illustrates “the range of proposed future battle fleet sizes in comparison to the Navy’s 
latest budget submission, and how these recommendations compare to the evolutionary 
approach taken in the 2016 FSA. What the figure also make clear is that while the Navy 
has been on a growth path in recent years, a change will be required to reach and sustain 
sufficient numbers” (Richardson, 2017, p.5). 
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Figure 3.  Proposed Navy Battle Fleet Sizes Source: Richardson (2017). 
Second, Richardson contends that, “the Navy must also incorporate new 
technologies and new operational concepts” (Richardson, 2017, p.1). The CNO 
emphasizes the importance of forward thinking, fast innovation, and technological 
superiority in order to stay competitive on a global scale with countries like China and 
Russia. He also recognizes the importance of being able to quickly respond to a variety of 
mission sets including diplomatic collaboration, disaster relief, and terrorism. The CNO 
states that the solution for achieving the desired future fleet is to simultaneously build and 
innovate to realize a larger, more distributed, and more capable force (Richardson, 2017). 
Undoubtedly, the solution to this complex situation will consist of a mix of 
approaches. It is also highly probable that one of those approaches will need to embrace 
AM as a piece of the answer to the CNO’s goals. An example of AM’s potential in the 
USN was evidenced in July 2017 when a partnership between the Naval Surface Warfare 
Center, Carderock Division’s Disruptive Technology Laboratory, and Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory resulted in the development of a prototype submersible that they, 
and multiple other partners including DARPA, ONR and Navy Special Warfare, began 
working on in August 2016. The 30-foot long vehicle, which is shown in Figure 4, is 
based on the Mark 8 Mod 1 SEAL delivery vehicle and represents the Navy’s largest 3D 
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printed asset (Diaz, 2017). It was produced at 90% cost savings and in less than a quarter 
of the time of a traditionally manufactured similar submersible. While this prototype is 
not functional or watertight, a second version is in development that is supposed to be a 
“fleet-capable prototype” and ready for use in 2019 (Liptak, 2017). 
 
Figure 4.  NPS Faculty and Students in Front of 3D Printed Navy Vessel 
These experiments provide proof that AM can produce valuable assets quickly 
and cheaply. Fully adopting this technology in the Navy would go a long way towards 
answering the CNO’s call for innovation that helps the Navy reach its fleet enlargement 
and capability goals. Figure 5 depicts “the kind of fleet we must pursue: one that is larger, 
yes, but more capable than any of the recent analyses have suggested, and arriving much 
more quickly. In short, a Navy that achieves an exponential rate of improvement” 
(Richardson, 2017, p. 9).  
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Figure 5.  Resultant Capability of New Fleet Design and Architecture. 
Source: Richardson (2017). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research questions pursued in this work include: 
1. What can be targeted in digital models used by the Navy for AM and how 
can the Navy best protect those models?  
2. What are the attitudes, opinions, and adoption trends identified in 
population of potential “change agents”? 
3. What issues relevant to cybersecurity stand in the way of successful large-
scale adoption of AM? 
4. What cybersecurity measures should be implemented to properly store and 
communicate AM data? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on the study of cybersecurity issues and potential effects that 
they may have on large-scale adoption of AM in the Naval domain. The study investigates 
the full life cycle of data and processes used in additive manufacturing from a cybersecurity 
perspective. Specifically, recommendations are made for cybersecurity applied to AM and 
identification of potential target vectors vulnerable to attack based on the Navy’s AM 
implementation models. Potential vulnerabilities exist based on human interaction with the 
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data, data creation, data storage, data sharing, and data translation into physical form. The 
study assesses ways to implement successful large-scale adoption of AM technology 
without compromising cybersecurity. The research survey population was comprised of 
current USA, USN, and USAF Officers that are resident students at NPS. This population 
represents potential future change agents and leaders within the DOD.  
E. THESIS CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis will benefit the Navy by creating an understanding of what the current 
obstacles are for user adoption of cybersecurity in Naval Additive Manufacturing. The 
thesis also offers recommendations on how best to mitigate those obstacles to encourage 
large-scale adoption of the capabilities available through Naval Fabrication Labs and 
traditional USN technology implementation models. Cybersecurity must be addressed and 
funded during the design and acquisition of the system; failing to do that may be more 
costly and difficult to fix later in the process. The benefits of including cybersecurity early 
on in the system development and adoption process include avoiding costly future upgrades 
and preventing security incidents throughout the process. Although this thesis focuses on 
the Naval domain, many of the issues presented are applicable in the joint environment as 
well. If each service independently develops service specific solutions within the AM 
domain then issues will arise when attempting to integrate those solutions in a joint war-
fighting environment. Additionally, some elements that are not specific to military domain 
are also highly applicable to civilian domain. 
F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter I offers an introduction to the to cybersecurity for large-scale adoption of 
AM in the Navy research domain and the motivation for this research. Chapter II 
provides more in depth background information about technology adoption, 
cybersecurity, and AM. Chapter III examines AM cybersecurity threats in the Naval 
domain. Chapter IV details the results from the research survey conducted as part of this 
thesis. Chapter V summarizes the research conclusions and offers recommendations and 
areas for future research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. BRIEF HISTORY AND EXPLANATION OF AM 
AM was conceived of by several European, Japanese, and American inventors in 
the early 1970s but the capability was not fully developed until the 1980s (McNulty, 
Arnas, & Campbell, 2012). Chuck Hull established the first AM company, 3D Systems, 
in 1986 after inventing the Stereolithography Rapid Printing System (McNulty, Arnas, & 
Campbell, 2012). The AM process creates objects from engineering design files typically 
built in Computer Aided Design (CAD) software programs. Unlike other manufacturing 
types that remove or alter material, AM 3D printers build the object from the base up, 
layer by layer using a wide variety of materials including plastics, metals, sand, glass, etc. 
(“What Is Additive Manufacturing,” 2013). The eight steps shown in Figure 6 generally 
define the AM process (Gibson, Rosen & Stucker, 2015, Chapter 1). 
 
Figure 6.  Generic AM Process. Source: Gibson, 
Rosen, and Stucker (2015). 
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1. Benefits of AM 
The benefits of AM include the ability to reverse engineer parts by 3D scanning 
the original part and then printing replicas, which is very useful and often characterized 
as critical when dealing with dated parts that are no longer available or supported by the 
companies that originally developed them. This benefit also applies to situations when 
there is an urgent need for an unavailable part, such as in the case of deployed ships 
where it is often not possible to order and receive parts on extremely short notice. AM 
also provides the capability to produce lighter weight parts without compromising 
strength depending on the internal mesh of the printed object (McNulty, Arnas, & 
Campbell, 2012). Additionally, AM provides costs savings due to more efficient resource 
usage, energy savings, and greater flexibility than traditional manufacturing processes. 
For the Navy, these benefits translate into increased independence for deployed units 
with greater capabilities to create customized objects that are needed on short notice. AM 
makes rapid prototyping and experimentation much more accessible to Sailors, which 
encourages cost-saving and mission-enhancing innovations. 
2. Concerns 
Multiple concerns exist based on the wide range of uses that AM can be applied 
to. One major concern, both in DOD and in the civilian market, is the ability to create 
counterfeit or fraudulent items. Theft of Intellectual Property (IP) by our competitors and/
or adversaries abroad is one issue that must be addressed before AM will see the support 
it needs for adoption (McNulty, Arnas, & Campbell, 2012). Potential Naval AM investors 
also have apprehension about the return on investment (ROI) from AM. However, as AM 
technology becomes less expensive, more capable, and faster, ROI concerns will 
dissipate. Most importantly, AM objects must be proven to be safe for Sailors to use and 
equipment to operate with. Finally, DOD must address their industrial base’s concerns 
that an advanced and extensive DOD AM capability could replace the manufacturing role 
that industry partners currently fill. 
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B. CURRENT STATE OF NAVAL AM DOMAIN 
 A variety of research teams, laboratories, and installations have already 
engaged in exploration of the AM landscape. There are at least 25 separate entities 
working in the Naval AM domain shown in Figure 7. Most of these units are focused on 
research, capabilities, and exploring possible applications of AM technology. However, 
adoption of any technology relies heavily on user trust in the highly automated processes 
that the technology is built on (Pak, Rovira, McLaughlin, & Baldwin, 2017).  
 
Figure 7.  Current State of Naval AM. Source: “Naval Additive Manufacturing 
Enterprise” (2017). 
AM technology adoption in the Naval domain is facing the same challenge of 
building trust from leadership and potential end users in the automation inherent in 
creating a 3D print. Generally, if users are not confident in the technology’s ability to 
achieve their desired result, it will be abandoned in favor of established methods. 
However, the level of trust required for adoption can vary greatly based on multiple 
factors including user group, domain of intended use, and degree of automation (Pak, 
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Rovira, McLaughlin, & Baldwin, 2017). The user group consisting of military members 
typically have higher trust judgments than the civilian population due to intensive 
training, increased discipline, and adherence to orders which may require the use of 
technology (Pak, Rovira, McLaughlin, & Baldwin, 2017). These factors may lead to the 
assumption that AM adoption in the Naval domain would be easier than in the civilian 
domain but multiple additional issues continue to stand in the way of adoption.  
At the 2017 Naval Additive Manufacturing Technology Interchange (NAMTI), 
keynote speaker Mr. Bryan Wood, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and 
Logistics, remarked that there is an urgent need for AM in the USN and USMC and that 
AM is a part of “hybrid logistics” to support forward deployed forces. These logistics 
take a modern view with a focus on providing combat support with the goal of lightening 
the amount of parts, tools, equipment, and supplies that need to be carried or transported. 
Instead, ideally AM would enable the creation of many of these necessities at or near the 
destination. However, the quality of the AM created object and the data that goes into 
making that object is extremely important. The object must be trustworthy and the data 
must be protected. The potential for numerous forward deployed AM capabilities 
inherently brings with it the potential for numerous opportunities for malicious actors to 
impact those capabilities. Possible malicious actions range from intellectual property 
theft of patented objects or data files to hardware attacks on AM printers. The Navy and 
Marine Corps wants to move forward as rapidly as possible with AM capabilities but has 
to do so in a safe and secure manner so as to not jeopardize the mission and the Sailors 
and Marines who are interacting with AM technology. 
One of the major outcomes from NAMTI was the need for a Naval AM digital 
storage and sharing solution. Representatives from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
are working on a digital repository also known as a “3D print exchange” with 
standardized file formats. Successful implementation for this solution must include 
availability in some form of a secure cloud environment that would be accessible by 
forward deployed Naval AM assets.  
Another AM adoption path the Navy is pursuing is via Naval Fabrication 
Laboratories (Fab Labs). Most of the Fab Labs are located in fleet concentration areas 
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including Norfolk, San Diego, and Jacksonville. However, there is also a mobile version 
that travels to provide familiarization training to Sailors and demonstrate the emerging 
capabilities of additive manufacturing (Eichner, 2016). Fab Labs have a limited 
capability due to the amount of space, equipment, personnel, and funding they have. 
While Each Fab Lab operates independently, there is agreement that the labs are not 
being utilized at a rate that is going to jump-start adoption of AM technology.  
C. AM DIGITAL THREAD AND CYBERSECURITY 
Applying the digital thread concept to AM enables tracking of AM objects and 
systems through their entire life cycle and analyzing the data collected during that 
process to quantify risks and inform decisions (Fielding et al., 2016). In November 2016 
the DOD released an AM Roadmap report that briefly addressed cybersecurity as the 
need to “ensure that all AM data is secure from design to production to storage.” 
(Fielding et al., 2016). When mission related AM printed objects are being created, 
transferred or stored, it is essential to ensure end-to-end file security to guarantee model 
integrity. If AM data is compromised, specific weaknesses could be introduced that 
would cause the object to fail. File checksums or hashes should be used to validate AM 
data, but they are only part of the solution, as they do not provide any protection for the 
data. Also, securing AM data alone does not go far enough towards providing 
cybersecurity for AM. The digital thread provides the map of the AM process that can be 
followed to examine cybersecurity vulnerabilities throughout the AM process.  
Effective cybersecurity for AM will have to address all vectors of AM subversion 
including hardware, where the printer itself could be compromised before or after 
installation, software, CAD creation, and data transmission and storage. As in most 
cybersecurity problem sets, the earlier that an AM cyber-attack is detected, the better. 
Early detection can result in cost savings due to material not being wasted on a defective 
product, time savings in both human and machine time, and prevention of damage to 
equipment and personnel. Most importantly, it is absolutely critical to ensure detection of 
malicious prints before the object is used.  
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Cybersecurity vulnerabilities exist in all stages of the AM life cycle as shown in 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  AM Process Vulnerabilities. Source: Bridges, 
Keiser, Sissom, and Graves (2015). 
In the software phases of the life cycle, commercial 3D printer and CAD software 
are becoming more vendor specific. Companies such as Makerbot and Cubify require the 
user to use their software to interact with their brand of printers. However, others 
including Lulzbot work with open-source software solutions like Cura (Baguley, 2017). 
Without a standard software solution, transferring CAD objects between different 
locations with different printers becomes very challenging. Cyber vulnerabilities may 
exist in the software or could be introduced when the software updates are distributed and 
installed. Both the printer and the CAD software must be able to receive and install 
updates without jeopardizing security. 
Network security introduces a wide range of cyber threats and vulnerabilities and 
is a crucial portion of AM cybersecurity. Networks are used to transfer AM data, monitor 
printer status and ongoing print progress, and send jobs to the printer (possibly 
wirelessly). Networks are also the main vectors for external threats to gain access to a 
system and steal data from organizations. 
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D. DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION 
The word “innovation” is over-used throughout the military and society at large to 
the point where it is used synonymously with invention. However, there are major 
differences between the two. Although innovation is typically associated with a new 
technology-based solution to a problem, the more appropriate term would be invention 
vise innovation. In the book The Innovators Way, innovation is defined as “the adoption 
of new practice in a community” (Denning and Dunham, 2010). Diffusion of innovation 
leading to large-scale adoption is a process that requires time, patience, resources, and 
trained innovation leaders who are given the opportunity to continuously improve their 
skillset. 
1. Conditions for Successful Adoption 
Simply providing the opportunity to utilize new technology is not enough to 
achieve the goal of large-scale adoption. In his book, Diffusion of Innovations, Everett 
Rodgers identifies five categories of individuals in the adoption process. They are 
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards (Rogers, 1995). 
Each of these groups represents a percentage of overall adopters as shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9.  Diffusion of Innovations. Source: OpenABM (2009). 
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Innovation requires more than a great invention, in fact it may not include an 
invention at all. As commented by Everett Rodgers, it needs persistent leadership, proper 
timing, sufficient investment of time and resources, and dedicated support. One of the 
greatest innovators in Naval History, Admiral Hyman Rickover, claimed “Good ideas are 
not adopted automatically. They must be driven into practice with courageous patience.” 
Trained innovation leaders can be make the difference as to whether or not adoption 
occurs, regardless of the potential of the actual innovation. Rogers refers to these 
individuals as “change agents” and states that “change agents aides” can assist them 
(Rogers, 1995).  
Innovation leaders expertly navigate through obstacles, mobilize networks, and 
bring together numerous contributors to reach adoption. Denning and Dunham detail 
eight essential practices that successful innovation leaders must be proficient in. These 
practices are sensing, envisioning, offering, adopting, sustaining, executing, leading, and 
embodying (Denning & Dunham, 2010). The practices are not linear, meaning you 
cannot start with sensing and step through each one to arrive at your desired result. They 
must be expertly integrated and applied at the appropriate time by an experienced 
innovator for the highest probability of success. The best opportunities for realization 
come from situations where the innovation leader has an opportunity to spend time within 
the adoption community and sense where there is any area of need that they may be able 
to address. 
For the military, innovation is not a choice—it is an imperative. The military must 
innovate faster than its adversaries or risk losing the ability to defend the Nation. It is also 
critical to realize that innovation inherently creates problems. Sometimes these problems 
reveal themselves early on in the innovation process and sometimes they appear well 
after adoption has occurred. Ideally, the goal should be to identify problems as early as 
possible and include solutions in the innovation plan. The ability to quickly address and 
correct these problems will be important to the success of Naval AM capabilities.  
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E. HUMAN ROLE IN CYBERSECURITY 
Although cyber attacks are more advanced and complex than ever, more often 
than not, people remain the biggest threats, vulnerabilities, and targets in the 
cybersecurity realm. AM is an incredible invention but cybersecurity is a large problem 
set inherent with AM and it must be planned for as part of AM innovation to achieve 
adoption. Cybersecurity solutions are a necessary part of AM innovation because they 
provide protection for the individuals involved in the adoption process. For large-scale 
Naval domain adoption, earning the trust of users and investors/decision makers hinges 
on the ability to demonstrate the safety and reliability of AM products. Cybersecurity 
helps ensure that AM objects will perform as they were designed to and will not put 
critical equipment, systems, and personnel at risk. 
A commonly identified issue in Cybersecurity systems is that it is difficult to 
separate true threats from unimportant data. Several reasons for this exist including too 
much data, ineffective notification systems, and under-staffed or under-trained 
cybersecurity teams (Dutta & Joyce, 2016, p. 13). Training users to be more 
conscientious about cybersecurity and more familiar with the cybersecurity features of 
the systems they are working with can assist cybersecurity professionals in preventing, 
detecting, and quickly correcting cybersecurity issues. 
While AM capabilities can benefit all warfare areas, the cybersecurity 
maintenance responsibilities for AM systems such as patching, installing updates, and 
conducting vulnerability scans should be assigned to trained personnel with cybersecurity 
expertise. Additionally, Naval AM systems need to have the ability enforce PoLP through 
effective Identification and Authentication (I&A) to ensure only system administrators 
have access to these capabilities.  
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III. AM CYBERSECURITY THREATS IN NAVAL DOMAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible to protect against all cybersecurity threats, and attempting to 
address each individual threat on an item-by-item basis is resource intensive and 
ultimately ineffective. More effective cybersecurity implementations use defense in depth 
to layer technical solutions, non-technical solutions, and supporting infrastructures like 
CAC, PKI, and biometrics throughout the life cycle to create a hardened infrastructure 
that addresses general categories of threats. Technical solutions are those that are 
implemented in hardware and software including firewalls, routers, network 
segmentation, detection and prevention devices, and secure coding while non-technical 
solutions include trained personnel, physical security, and proven TTPs. 
B. DATA INPUT 
Most commercial 3D printers that would be adapted for Naval use include 
multiple methods for connecting data files from external sources to the printer itself. 
Some examples of these connections are via removable devices such as SD cards or flash 
drives. These types of devices present a threat because they can be used to easily transfer 
malware from infected devices into the 3D printer. They also make it easy for insider 
threats with access to the printer to steal files.  
In addition to removable devices, Wi-Fi connectivity is another popular feature 
that makes it very easy to transfer files to a 3D printer. While this method is very user 
friendly and convenient, it introduces another path for attackers to exploit cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities. The portability benefits that Wi-Fi capabilities provide should only be 
available for temporary situations that are approved and executed by a trusted system 
administrator.  
The third type of connection is via USB cable tethered to a supporting computer. 
The computer must stay powered and connected throughout the print process unless the 
printer has some embedded storage that the file can be downloaded to. While this method 
does present some risk of malware transferring from the connected computer to the 3D 
 22 
printer, it is safer than the other options and the risk can be minimized by properly 
securing the connected computer. Additionally, using public and private key asymmetric 
encryption to digitally sign files can provide authentication to make sure files have not 
been modified during transfer from a secure CAD development system to a secure 3D 
printing system. Firewalls, malware protection, antivirus protection, host intrusion 
detection systems (HIDS), and host intrusion prevention systems (HIPS) between CAD 
systems and production systems provide additional cyber security protection and should 
be included in the overall system design. 
Ideally any USB connection would be established only when a 3D print file was 
being transferred to the printer, and then removed immediately following transfer. While 
this process results in slightly more work for the user, it also keeps the printer air gapped 
for the majority of its life cycle providing a much smaller target window for the 3D 
printer. This could also be used as an opportunity for a trusted supervisor to check the 
data before allowing the USB cable connection.  
Finally, quality assurance (QA) is engrained in Navy processes and should be 
developed and implemented for AM as well. AM QA would provide standard methods to 
evaluate AM designs and products to ensure accuracy, security, and to systematically 
inspect the finished 3D printed object. These methods should be created with the end-user 
in mind so as not to build an overly complicated or burdensome AM QA process that 
would deter potential users from adopting the technology.  
C. INSIDER THREAT 
While it is commonly assumed that most cybersecurity threats come from external 
sources, studies show that an estimated 58% of reported incidents come from insiders 
(Nurse et al., 2014). For Naval AM, the insider is anyone who is trusted with access to 
Naval AM systems or data at any point in the life cycle. The insider threat can be 
separated into two broad categories; malicious and accidental (Nurse et al., 2014). 
Malicious insiders threaten AM CIA through intentional actions while accidental insiders 
do damage through unintentional human error. Understanding insider attacks through 
characterization can help with prevention.  
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Characterization can be achieved through four broad categories of identifying a 
catalyst, actor characteristics, attack characteristics, and organization characteristics as 
shown in Figure 10 (Nurse et al., 2014). However, from a cybersecurity perspective many 
of the same measures can be used to prevent both malicious and accidental threats. 
Adhering to the PoLP while designing and implementing AM cybersecurity will go a 
long way towards preventing Insider threats.  
 
Figure 10.  A Framework for Characterizing Insider Attacks. 
Source: Nurse et al. (2014) 
D. POWER THREATS 
Loss of power, regardless of the cause, could cripple a Naval unit’s AM capability 
and severely degrade cybersecurity measures protecting the AM system. Each of the 
types of power outages in the following list could also interrupt a print in progress, 
possibly causing the print to have to be restarted by an operator from where it left off or 
from the beginning of the print. Worse still, they could potentially damage AM printer or 
connected computers and systems. Types of power issues Naval AM systems should have 
protection against include: 
 24 
 Brown outs—short term drop in voltage  
 Black outs—total loss of power 
 Spikes—Instantaneous massive boost in voltage 
 Surges—momentary rise in voltage 
 Noise—electromagnetic interference 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Ultimately the potential adversary’s decision to attack the system depends on the 
work factor to achieve their desired result. If the system is difficult to attack and the gain 
to the adversary is low, then they are more likely to spend time and effort on a higher 
value system. Currently, AM presents an easy target because there are no standards for 
verification of AM products. The Navy must establish clear cybersecurity policies and 
standards that provide guidance to companies and forces them to build security into their 
AM products. AM becomes an even greater target if it is used to make safety-critical 
products, such as parts found in aircraft, due to the cyber-physical nature of AM. One 
minor change that goes undetected on the cyber side could have devastating results on the 
physical form. Policy is the key to driving AM cybersecurity into system design, 
implementation, and ultimately large-scale adoption. 
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IV. USER STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the results of the Technology Use and AM adoption survey 
by examining the responses of the participants; all surveyed participants were resident 
students at the Naval Postgraduate School. Due to a limited time frame to include 
additional IRB review procedure requested by USMC IRB Committee for USMC 
students-participants, the survey was approved and made available to USA, USN, and 
USAF resident NPS students. The chapter includes discussion of the design and 
execution of the survey and highlights statistical results from representative questions in 
each section. 
B. STUDY DESIGN 
The study was designed as an empirical research survey to acquire insights and 
generate useful understandings about adoption of AM in the Navy based on user 
responses. USA and USAF personnel were included in the survey to provide a 
comparison between the services. The goal was to use the qualitative and quantitative 
research results to generate hypotheses or theories based on the data gathered and derive 
general conclusions that can be used to support the Naval AM adoption process. The 
survey is modeled after the questionnaire conducted by USMC Captain Matthew Friedell 
as part of his NPS thesis “Additive manufacturing in expeditionary operations: current 
needs, technical challenges, and opportunities” but extends his work with a focus on 
cybersecurity. Included in the survey are several demographic questions to allow for 
comparison between different ages, genders, service affiliations, primary jobs, ranks, 
time in service, and education level. The full text of the questionnaire is included in 
Appendix A. Following the demographic section are sections on use of technology and 
recreational resources, 3D printing, adoption, and cybersecurity. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The survey development process began by identifying general categories of 
interest that were focused on cybersecurity and adoption of technology innovations, and 
researching previously conducted surveys that could be used as models. Then individual 
questions within each category were written, and question and answer format was 
established (i.e. Likert scale, drop-down menu, etc.). Most survey answers were 
quantitatively formatted but several areas allowed for qualitative follow-on responses 
from participants as well. Multiple versions of the survey were constructed and modified 
throughout the questionnaire development process. Once finalized, the survey and 
required documentation were submitted to the NPS IRB for approval; the author also 
developed the online version of the survey utilizing LimeSurvey provided tools 
(LimeSurvey server has been provided and maintained by NPS). Once IRB approval was 
received, the survey was activated and participant recruitment began. All participants 
were uncompensated volunteers who were solicited a maximum of three times through 
their NPS email account, the NPS student muster webpage or face-to-face requests. Only 
resident NPS students who are active duty Officers in the USA, USN or USAF were 
allowed to participate. IRB documentation, recruitment script, and full survey are 
included in Appendix A. 
D. APPARATUS 
Anonymous data collection was performed through LimeSurvey provided 
capabilities. Participants accessed the questionnaire through a hyperlink provided in the 
recruitment script leading to LimeSurvey, where data was collected and stored until 
survey deactivation. No PII was collected or stored during the survey.  
E. SUBJECTS 
A total of 124 participants accessed the questionnaire via Lime Survey. Of those, 
96 completed the survey, and 15 partially completed it but did not provide enough 
responses to be of value for analysis. The remaining 13 people did not consent to taking 
the survey. Out of the 96 usable responses, 75 were from USN, 11 were from USAF, and 
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10 were from USA personnel. Among the 96 members who completed the survey, the 
average time spent answering it was approximately 13 minutes and 30 seconds. 
F. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section highlights the quantitative and qualitative findings from the 96 
surveys completed. It addresses each of the major categories in the survey 
(demographics, use of technology and recreational resources, 3D printing, adoption, and 
cybersecurity).  
1. Demographics 
Questions in this section were designed to allow the researchers to parse 
information based on the following characteristics of respondents:  
 age 
 gender 
 service affiliation and designator/MOS/AFSC 
 rank 
 time in service 
 use of social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, Pinterest, 
LinkedIn, Google+, MeetUp) 
Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 summarize responses to the demographics questions. 
AS Table 3 illustrates, USN officers greatly outnumbered the other respondents but this is 
expected being that the majority of resident students are USN Officers. However, having 
representation from USA and USAF participants allows for some comparison of views 
based on service affiliation.  
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Table 1.   Age Statistics in Years 
 
Table 2.   Gender Statistics 
 
Table 3.   Service Affiliation Statistics 
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Table 4.   Rank Statistics 
 
Table 5.   Time in Service Statistics in Years 
 
Table 6.   Social Media Membership Statistics 
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For social media questions, respondents were asked to select all of the types they 
are members of. Social media usage results can provide valuable insight into where to 
focus efforts to promote adoption. The collected data set suggests that the majority of 
surveyed participants (80.21%) use Facebook, and to a much smaller extent LinkedIn 
(39.58%), Instagram (34.38%) and other social media shown in Table 6. Facebook, due 
to its large audience, and LinkedIn, due to its connection to the professional community 
and specialized content, appear to be the best candidates to promote the use of AM. 
2. Use of Technology, Exposure to Media, and Technology Influences 
Questions in this section focus on the types of technology participants’ use 
including video games and applications, and how they view their use of technology 
compared to others. Additionally, information was gathered on how respondents prefer to 
learn to use service provided recreational resources such as computer labs or gym 
equipment. Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 highlight some of the findings from this section of 
questions. Statistics in Table 7 suggest that the majority of respondents do not see 
themselves as early adopters, as 57.30% either “somewhat disagreed,” “disagreed,” or 
“strongly disagreed” with the question posed. However, they do appear to seek 
information on technology devices with 59.38% replying with “somewhat agree” or 
above as shown in Table 8.  
Table 7.   Tendency to Purchase Technology Devices First 
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Table 8.   Tendency to Pursue Technology Device Information 
 
 
Table 9 demonstrates the power that expert opinion has on the adoption of 
technology with 78.13% of responses indicating that they at least “somewhat agree” that 
they personally prefer to wait for expert opinions before purchasing technology (answers 
‘Somewhat agree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly agree’ being added up; the same responses for 
USN population amounted to 76%). Similar results were given for question related to 
influence of peers’ opinions on purchases of technology devices—Table 10 illustrates 
that majority of respondents declare high appreciation for opinions of their peers. The 
results suggest that 57.29% agree with that statement to some extent (responses 
‘Somewhat agree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly agree’ being added up; results for USN were 
53.33%). Similar questions were asked about purchasing video games and apps and in 
each case expert opinion was very influential in the purchase decision. 
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Table 9.   Expert Opinion Influence 
 
Table 10.   Peer Opinion Influence 
 
 
Table 11 displays the results when respondents were asked for their self-
assessment regarding their new technology purchasing tendencies. The statement that 
provided the information for Table 11 is “I am among the last to purchase new 
technology devices.” Subjects were asked to respond by choosing an answer by from the 
Likert scale provided, which used ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” 
This question was purposefully designed to provide verification of the information 
gathered from the question in Table 7, which is “I am among the first to purchase new 
technology devices.” There appears to be a correlation between answers provided to the 
inverse questions. For example, most respondents somewhat agreed (27.08%) that they 
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were among the first to purchase new technology devices, and somewhat disagreed 
(23.96%) that they were among the last to purchase new technology devices. 
Table 11.   Tendency to Purchase Technology Devices Last 
 
 
These questions and answers can be used to determine groups that are predisposed 
to technology adoption and who are more likely to be early adopters. 
3. Use of Applications, Exposure to Media and Application Influences  
This portion of the survey was designed to further refine the profile of the 
respondents by determining their use of applications. The vast majority of technology 
devices used on an everyday basis on smart phones are reliant on applications so insight 
into applications usage also provides insight into technology use of the respondents. If the 
response to the first question, “Do you download and/or purchase applications” was 
“No,” follow on questions in this section were omitted for that individual. The questions 
in this section are very similar to the technology devices section and results are displayed 
in Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. The vast majority of survey participants (86.46%) 
said that they download or purchase applications as shown in Table 12, but most do not 
consider themselves among the first to do so with 71.87% (Table 13) responding with 
“Somewhat disagree,” “Disagree,” or “Strongly disagree.” 
 34 
Table 12.   App Exposure 
 
Table 13.   Tendency to Purchase Apps First 
 
 
The results in Table 14 are similar to those in Table 13, as 68.75% of participants 
“Somewhat disagree,” “Disagree,” or “Strongly disagree” that they stay updated on the 
latest information about new applications. Even though overall application usage is high, 
it does not appear that there is enough interest in them to motivate respondents to seek 
out information or be early adopters of applications. 
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Table 14.   Tendency to Pursue App Information 
 
 
Table 15 indicates a fairly even distribution of responses regarding the influence 
of expert opinions on application purchasing decisions. Across all responses scores 
ranged from a low of 10.42% for “Strongly disagree” and “Somewhat disagree” to a high 
of 18.75% in the “Somewhat Agree” category. The one response that differed from this 
trend was “Strongly agree” with only 3.13% of participants (all Navy) choosing that 
option. 




Peer influence appears to have a slightly stronger influence than expert influence 
when deciding to acquire applications. According to survey answers shown in Table 16, 
43.75% “Somewhat agree,” “Agree,” or “Strongly Agree” that they wait for peers 
opinions, while 37.51% felt the same way about waiting for expert opinions (Table 15). 
Table 16.   Peer Opinion Influence 
 
 
Table 17 depicts that participants did not have strong opinions about whether they 
were among the last to purchase applications as 50% of responses were in the range from 
“Somewhat disagree” to “Somewhat agree.” 
Table 17.   Tendency to Purchase Apps Last 
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4. Recreational Resources 
The survey questions on the use of recreational resources may translate into some 
techniques that could be useful to help increase the use of Fab Labs, and also in assessing 
preferences for learning how to use the resources provided. Tables 18, 19, and 20 
summarize the responses for this portion of the survey. While a combination of training 
options is considered to give the best results (Tables 18, 19 and 20), respondents heavily 
preferred using “trial and error” techniques (Table 19) and Internet sources to learn how 
to use the equipment (Table 20). To encourage the use of Fab Labs, it will be important 
to market them as places to experiment and to ensure that patrons have access to Internet 
self-help websites such as YouTube.  
Table 18.   Likelihood to Ask Employee 
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Table 19.   Likelihood of Trial and Error Approach 
 
Table 20.   Likelihood of Using Internet Sources 
 
 
5. 3D Printing 
The 3D printing section of the questionnaire was designed to assess participants’ 
knowledge, opinions, and experience with 3D printing. Additionally, participants 
provided qualitative responses regarding concerns they had about 3D printing in the 
military domain. Table 21 indicates that almost all participants felt that they know what 
3D printing is with 90.62% responding with “Somewhat agree” or higher. Also, 58.33% 
at least “Somewhat agree” that 3D printing would be useful in their work center (Table 
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22) even though only 8% (Table 23) served in units that use 3D printed objects and 15% 
have a 3D printing capability as shown in Table 24.  
Table 21.   Knowledge of 3D Printing 
 
 
Regardless of the answer to the question that Table 21 is based on, participants 
were next asked to describe 3D printing in their own words. Many of the qualitative 
responses demonstrated some understanding of 3D printing. Full responses are included 
in Appendix B Part A.  
Table 22.   Opinion on Usefulness of 3D Printing in Work Center 
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Table 23.   Use of 3D Printed Objects at Current or Previous Unit 
 
 
Respondents answering “Yes” were asked to provide further explanation of what 
the 3D printed objects were. All responses are listed here together with service affiliation: 
USN—“We use 3D printed housing parts for gas turbine research.” 
USN—“Prototype design parts” 
USN—“Ordnance item mock-ups for training.” 
USN—“3D printers are part of the MOVES Savage Lab. Printed parts are used as 
markers for augmented reality trainer.” 
USN—“Personal use, hobby” 
USN—“Satellite components” 
USAF—“Prototypes for aircraft maintenance pieces—it shortens the process of 
sending technical drawings to the machine shop, waiting on it and then testing, 
and if not exact working prototype, having to resend—it helps to print overnight 
and test the next morning and repeat the process if necessary.” 
USA—“Mostly, there are just demonstrations of the systems capabilities. From 
small vehicle models to various common items (bolts, washers, etc.)” 




The 11.46% of respondents shown in Table 25 who answered “Yes” were asked 
to provide further explanation of what the 3D printed objects were. All responses are 
listed here with service affiliation: 
USN—“We printed test parts for research.” 
USN—“Prototype design parts” 
USN—“Ordnance item mock-ups for training.” 





USAF—“Aircraft maintenance prototype pieces” 
USAF—“Thesis” 
USA—“Items related to thesis/dissertation and instructor research” 
Table 25.   Unit 3D Printed Objects for Work Use  
 
Tables 26 shows that most respondents do not feel that they personally could use 
3D printing to make their workplace more efficient, but Tables 27 and 28 show that they 
believe 3D printing is useful. The responses in Table 26 are most likely indicative of a 
lack of training on 3D printing, and not an indictment on the ability of the technology to 
make a positive impact on the efficiency of the workplace.  
 42 
Table 26.   Immediate Workplace Impact of 3D Printing 
 
Table 27.   Opinion on Impact of 3D Printing on Supply Chain and Part Storage 
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Table 28.   Opinion on Usefulness of 3D Printing to Service 
 
 
Regardless of the answer to the question that Table 28 is based on, participants 
were next asked to provide examples. Full responses are included in Appendix B Part B. 
Tables 29 and 30 signify decent awareness levels about service pursuit of 3D printing 
within the USN (52.00%) and USA (60.00%), but very low awareness of specific items 
being used (USN 8.00% and USA 20.00%). 
Table 29.   Awareness of Service Pursuit of 3D Printing 
 
 44 
Table 30.   Awareness of Service Use of 3D Printed Objects  
 
 
Respondents answering “Yes” were asked to provide further explanation of what 
the 3D printed objects were. All responses are listed here with service affiliation: 
USN—“Replacement parts for the Osprey” 
USN—“Ordnance item mock-ups for training” 
USN—“I know they have used them, I do not remember exactly what it was” 
USN—“Don’t know of specific places. Have heard of both surface fleet use and 
air use.” 
USN—“I know some of the EOD units in San Diego are using 3D printers to print 
training aids” 
USN—“Fasteners” 
USAF—“Parts that are no longer being manufactured but are still being required 
for operations” 
USA—“Drone bodies and parts” 
USA—“Spare parts for M4 rifle” 
 
Table 31 shows that there is some heavy doubt among respondents across all 
services that every command will have a 3D printer in the next 5 years. This could be due 
to a lack of belief in the services’ investment in the technology, the wide-ranging 
usefulness of AM, or the need to have the capability at every command. 
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Table 31.   Belief in Future Investment of 3D Printing 
 
 
The full verbatim responses to “what problem(s) do you see with respect to 3D 
printing” are included in Appendix B Part C, and are summarized by category in Table 
32. These responses are excellent indicators of the current perception about issues 
involved with the adoption of 3D printing in the Naval domain and provides innovation 
leaders with concerns that can be directly addressed during the adoption process.  
Table 32.   Categories of Most Frequent Qualitative Responses to 3D Problems  
 
6. Adoption 
This section attempts to identify potential influences on the adoption of 
technology in the military domain including speed of adoption, leadership influence and 
knowledge at the service and unit levels.  
Generally, the Navy’s adoption speed was not highly rated with 71.89% of 
respondents replying with “fair” or worse as shown in Table 33. The capability to quickly 
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adopt new technologies is important in order for the military to compete for personnel 
who want to use new technologies and to stay competitive globally with countries that 
implement new technology quickly.  
Table 33.   Service Technology Adoption Speed 
 
 
Service leadership (Table 34) is considered to have a large influence on the 
adoption of new technology, as demonstrated by over 75% of responses ranking it as 
“Important” or “Very important.” Unit leadership results (Table 35) were slightly lower 
but the majority of respondents (57.29%) believe their endorsement and full support of 
new technology is “important” or higher as well. 
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Table 34.   Service Leaderships’ Impact on Technology Adoption 
 
Table 35.   Unit Leaderships’ Impact on Technology Adoption 
 
 
Tables 36 and 37 illustrate that the perceived knowledge level about 3D printing 
is somewhat higher among service leadership (35.42% answered “Slightly 
knowledgeable” or better), than it is for unit leadership (28.13% answered “Slightly 
knowledgeable” or better).  
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Table 36.   Service Leaderships’ knowledge of 3D Printing 
 
Table 37.   Unit Leaderships’ knowledge of 3D Printing 
 
 
Tables 38 and 39 suggest that while there is some apparent support for 3D 
printing at the service and unit leadership levels, most respondents were “Neutral” on the 
topic (37.50% in Table 38, 42.71% in Table 39). 
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Table 38.   Service Leaderships’ Support of 3D Printing 
 




Prior to answering questions in this section of the survey, participants were 
provided with the following definition of cyber security:  
The prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, 
electronic communications systems, electronic communications systems 
services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including 
information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation. (The White House, 
2008) 
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All surveys participants who answered the question regarding whether they had 
cyber security training in the past, had received some type of cyber security training per 
Table 40. 
Table 40.   Cyber Security Training Exposure  
 
Additionally, Table 41 shows that most (77.08%) had cyber security training in 
the past six months and all had it within the last year. General military training 
requirements are the most likely reason for the high positive response to this question. 
Table 41.   Cyber Security Training Timeframe 
 
 
Table 42 reflects that even though most participants had recently had cyber 
security training, they were still concerned about security of their personal devices with 
81.26% replying they were at least “Slightly concerned.” 
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Table 42.   Level of Concern about Cyber Security for Personal Devices 
 
 
Table 43 shows that the majority of respondents (58.33%) had not experienced a 
cyber security problem on their personal technology devices, but for those who did the 
timeframe for that incident is displayed in Table 44. Furthermore, most participants 
(81.26%) were at least “Slightly concerned” about cyber security for their personal 
devices even if they had not personally experienced issues. These results suggest that 
current and future military innovators care about cyber security, and it should be 
addressed when adopting new technology in the military. 
Table 43.   Personally Experienced Cyber Security Problem 
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Table 44.   Cyber Security Problem Timeframe 
 
 
Tables 45 and 46 suggest that most participants do not feel the need for additional 
cyber security training (86.47% responded with “Fair” or better) and have confidence in 
the cyber security capabilities of their work systems.  
Table 45.   Amount of Cyber Security Training 
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Table 46.   Cyber Security Protection of Technology Devices Used at Work 
 
 
Table 47 indicates that most respondents were divided about whether cyber 
security measures prevent access to helpful work-related material with 38.55% 
“Somewhat disagreeing” or below, and 41.67% “Somewhat agreeing” or above. 
Table 47.   Prevention of Access to Helpful Content Due to Cyber Security 
 
 
The results in Table 48 suggest that there is not a clear connection for most 
participants between cyber security and 3D printing as 41.67% answered at most 
“Neither disagree or agree” to the question.  
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Table 48.   Relationship Between 3D Printing and Cyber Security 
 
 
Participants had mixed opinions regarding the trustworthiness of 3D printed 
objects and files. Table 49 showed that 26.05% of respondents disagreed at some level 
that they would have confidence in the trustworthiness of 3D printed objects at work, 
while 42.71% agreed at some level. However, Table 50 conveys the same amount of trust 
for a 3D digital file, as 42.71% of applicants “somewhat agreed,” “agreed,” or “strongly 
agreed” that they would have confidence that the file would be protected from 
compromise or modification. 
Table 49.   Trust of 3D Printed Object 
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Table 50.   Trust of 3D Digital File 
 
 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided insight into the research survey’s creation, approval and 
implementation process, as well as participant recruitment and access to the survey. 
Additionally, statistics were provided to support noteworthy conclusions regarding the 
opinions of survey participants. While a larger and more diverse population would be 
desirable, the findings are a good indicator of the opinions of current and future military 
technology innovation leaders or “change agents.”  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Generally, cyber is an unknown, at times mysterious, and misunderstood domain. 
IT users often believe that cybersecurity creates extra work when they want to be able to 
use technology as effortlessly as possible. Providing user education and sufficient, easy to 
follow documentation can help alleviate user frustrations but overly laborious or 
complicated cybersecurity measures can impede potential adoption of new technology. 
However, acceptable security must be achieved that balances user trust in the system with 
potential vulnerabilities that exist based on human interaction with the data, data creation, 
data storage, data sharing, and data translation into physical form. 
1. Layered Solutions 
Cybersecurity for AM requires layered solutions applied at all stages of the life 
cycle. Addressing cybersecurity while Naval AM capabilities are still in their infancy 
allows for broad, built-in, proactive solutions that minimize costly reactive patches that 
only address specific threats later in the life cycle. Additionally, cybersecurity supports 
adoption of AM technology by building trust in the technology from end-users and 
decision makers. Just as cyber touches all other warfare areas, AM technology can 
benefit all warfare areas as well. Programs like annual required cybersecurity training for 
all Sailors and NPS’s newly piloted “All Hands General Cyber Course” help, but tailored, 
system specific AM training is still needed to reduce the greatest threat, the human threat, 
to AM cybersecurity. 
2. Stand-Alone Ability 
Fully operationalizing AM requires the ability to utilize it in a stand-alone 
configuration. This would necessitate preloading all digital files, having trained 
maintenance personnel, developing access and authentication methods, and having 
supporting policy in place for accounting for printed objects. The more connected and 
network dependent the AM system is, the more vulnerable it is to cyber-attacks and the 
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less useful and reliable it will be to Sailors. Navy ships are ideal locations for 
incorporating AM technology because they have the capability to operate independently 
of the shore-based power grids. Their ability to create their own electricity means they 
can deliver AM capabilities to any mission anywhere in the world. 
3. Adoption Impediments 
Cybersecurity poses a very real threat to the potential for large-scale adoption of 
AM technology in the Naval domain. If Navy leadership does not trust that the 
technology is safe from cyber threats, they will not substantially invest in it. Additionally, 
if Sailors do not trust the products they get from AM or if the AM process is overly 
encumbered by non user friendly security measures, they will default to traditional 
methods and resist mandatory change implemented from a top down approach. Accepting 
that users are the biggest threats, targets, and vulnerabilities in the cybersecurity domain, 
means investing in improving user behavior through training designed to produce 
security outcomes that provide more fundamental protection.  
The survey results show that leadership plays an extremely important role in the 
large-scale adoption of innovation at both the service and unit level. Leaders are critical 
to the process and should not be expected to effectively implement innovation without 
appropriate training. Creating a culture of innovation with the Navy is a difficult 
challenge. However, adding innovation into the curriculum at Naval Officer education 
programs such as ROTC units, NPS and Naval War College would be a great start 
towards training innovation leaders. Beyond infusing the Officer ranks with innovation 
training, every service member can be an innovation leader if the culture embraces it. 
B. THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS 
The Navy is becoming more reliant on the civilian technology sector and utilizing 
COTS solutions whenever possible. This reliance does not come without added risk 
because the adversary can purchase the same systems that the Navy has, and find ways to 
compromise them. Military organizations like DIUX are making procurement of those 
technologies faster and more affordable then ever before, and the Secretary of the Navy 
Tours with Industry (SNTWI) program helps provide the Navy with personnel that have 
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valuable knowledge and skills about practices that can translate from the civilian domain 
to the Naval domain. However, adoption of those technologies and practices relies on 
developing a culture of innovation within the Navy. Building that culture requires an 
investment in teaching Sailors to think like innovators by embedding innovation training 
at all levels of the Chain of Command. Innovation should not be limited to R&D and 
procurement organizations; it should be the responsibility of leaders at every level 
(Hamel & Tennant, 2015).  
The same is true in regards to cybersecurity. According to the National Military 
Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, “leaders at all levels are accountable for ensuring 
readiness and security to the same degree as in any other domain” (Office of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006). NPS provides an excellent opportunity to 
teach approximately 500 Naval Officers per year about innovation and cyber if those 
topics were included in all curriculums as shown in Figure 11 (Naval Postgraduate 
School Command Brief, 2016). 
 
Figure 11.  NPS Resident Student Enrollment. 
Source: NPS Command Brief (2016).  
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Currently at NPS, the Innovation Leadership course provides theoretical concepts, 
practical exercises, and applications that lay the groundwork to transform students into 
innovation leaders. However, this is an elective course with a small throughput relative to 
the NPS student population. If the Navy is serious about promoting a culture of 
cybersecurity awareness and innovation, NPS is one option for planting the seed for both 
in future Naval leaders. 
Additionally, the environment should be conducive to challenging traditional 
methods. The Navy is often slow to change and heavily reliant on precedent, factors that 
can be counter productive to innovation. This does not suggest that everyone should be or 
is even capable of being an innovator, some individuals are naturally more inclined 
towards the practice than other—but rather as a Navy it is highly recommended that 
service members be generally trained about how to innovate and encourage our Sailors to 
challenge the status quo. The Navy practice is heavily inclined towards quantifying and 
justifying everything based on metrics, but it is important to recognize that metrics for 
innovation are difficult and the requirement for metrics may hinder the speed of 
innovation. 
There are two primary methods for AM implementation in the Navy. The first is 
providing AM capabilities and training to commands and the second is in the form of 
Naval Fabrication Labs. Commands provided with AM would need trained personnel and 
guidance as to what and who are authorized to utilize the equipment. A case can be made 
for every ship and command in the Navy to have some type of 3D printing capability. 
Consider the increased capabilities of the Navy’s hospital ships if they were equipped 
with bio printers. These ships spend most of their time assigned to Humanitarian and 
Disaster Relief (HADR) missions and have the capacity to serve as up to a 1,000 bed 
mobile hospital (Department of the Navy [DON], n.d.). With bio printers capable of 
printing human tissue and organs, these ships could provide advanced medical treatment 
that technologically is not available in the majority of the World. Rapid deployment of 
printing platforms for testing and also for use in 3D production of bio materials to 
support HADR missions, such as USNS Comforts recent assignment to Puerto Rico in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Maria (Garamone, 2017) would be impressive, but adding it to 
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the medical services provided to warfighters in a combat zone would be extraordinary 
and would undoubtedly save service members’ lives.  
C. FUTURE WORK 
This section suggests further research into the development of a Joint AM 
solution to aid in adoption, which would allow all services to benefit from shared AM 
capabilities. Additionally, the emergence of Blockchain technology may provide an 
answer to securing a large portion of the AM life cycle and warrants further study. 
1. Joint AM 
Current AM approaches vary greatly throughout the U.S. military services and 
appear to be allowing each service to develop AM capabilities in a bubble, isolated from 
one another. This will undoubtedly result in separate solutions in each service that will 
likely be incompatible, especially if each service has different digital infrastructures and 
cybersecurity solutions for AM. However, in order for the DOD to fully capitalize on the 
potential of AM, a solution that can be applied to a joint environment is necessary. Joint 
operations are the norm in modern day military environments and officers throughout the 
services are expected to pursue Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and 
achieve joint qualifications.  
Future application of AM could result in forward deployed service members 3D 
printing parts and supplies while engaged in joint operations around the world. Speaking 
at the Air Force Association’s Air, Space, and Cyber Conference, Commander Air Force 
Material Command General Pawlikowski stated, “The future of Air Force logistics will 
find Airmen tapping into a secure digital network or archived additive manufacturing 
specifications, allowing for the 3D-printed creation of a weapons system component 
whenever and wherever needed” (National Center For Manufacturing Sciences [NCMS], 
2017). The same vision can be applied in each of the armed forces but it would be 
wasteful for each service to bring a separate AM capability to an operation when a joint 
AM solution could be developed for all services. Additionally, if the separate service AM 
solutions are incompatible, then the benefits of redundancy that could be available from a 
joint solution are minimized and an AM system failure of any one system could cripple 
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that unit’s combat readiness. However, if a joint AM solution were deployed, all units 
with AM capability could serve as backups to each other. 
If forward deployed AM capabilities are going to be used in joint operations, then 
they must be developed with joint standards, qualifications, accreditation, security 
infrastructure, and processes to enable sharing across the DOD. More research should be 
done into how best to develop and implement a collaborative AM solution that aligns the 
development of AM between the services towards the goal of achieving a joint solution. 
Organizations such as Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUX) and Joint 
Interoperability Test Command (JITC) have experience developing joint solutions and 
should be leveraged against the AM problem set with the goal of developing a Unified 
Additive Manufacturing Services Management Office. 
2. Blockchain applicability 
The scope of this thesis did not include investigating technical cybersecurity 
solutions to the cyber-physical AM problem set but that is certainly an area for follow on 
research and devolvement. A possible way forward is through the application of 
Blockchain technology, which can create a secure, immutable record of anything that is 
describable in digital form. Since the Blockchain concept was first introduced by Satoshi 
Nakamoto in his paper “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,” applications 
and variations of Blockchains have grown exponentially. Nakamoto’s implementation, 
which relies on public and private keys, constant proof-of-work effort by participants to 
create the next block, and incentives for participant based on transaction fees, included 
the necessity to publicly announce all transactions (Nakamoto, 2008). However, privacy-
friendly solutions such as Gaurdtime Federal’s Keyless Signature Infrastructure are now 
available that would allow permission-based participation in an AM Blockchain across a 
distributed network that could track the full AM life cycle including hardware 
development, digital thread, and part provenance. Applying this type of solution in a 
communications degraded or denied environment could present some unique challenges, 
and classification levels would have to be considered as AM technology and capabilities 
grow to the point of being able to create classified objects. 
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APPENDIX B. QUALITATIVE SURVEY RESPONSES 
A. FULL ANSWERS TO “DESCRIBE 3D PRINTING IN YOUR OWN 
WORDS,” LISTED BY SERVICE. 
1. USN
1. Not sure
1. I really don’t know. I assume you can create a three dimensional design
and it is then created for you, but I am not sure what it would really look
like.
2. Making multidimensional items using strings of a material.
3. A method to create a tangible 3D model using some computer interface.
4. You upload drawings into a computer, attatch a printer with 3D
capabilities, and hit print.
5. Using a box like printer to dynamically create a three-dimensional object.
6. Print a 3D object
7. A machine which maintains digital 3D models of objects and then forms
those digital objects into real objects by “printing” them from melted
plastics and/or metals on to a surface in successive layers.
8. Similar to a CNC machine, the ability to create an object vice a 2D image
9. 3D printing allows a user to create an object out of a raw product, the
object thus existing in the x,y,z plane. The creation of the object is
controlled through a user input computer based program, which transmits
those inputs to a device which either adds raw material to create an object
or carves an object out of raw stock.
10. A printer uses synthetic material to build an object in layers based on the
design sent from a computer program.
11. Creating 3D objects.
12. Instead of paper, the 3D printer takes a compound, such as a metal or
plastic and instead of text or pictures it creates an object with length, width
and height.
13. model imaging in three dimensions
14. You use computer programs to design a three-dimensional object, then
you choose a material for it to be ‘printed’ on / made of, then use the 3D
printer to physically build a 3D representation of the object you designed.
15. Using 3D printers to create 3D objects such as parts for aircraft, models,
etc.
16. Printing 3D models
17. A printer that turns a computer design/concept into a printed tangible
object.
18. The use of lasers and technology to print items in 3d form without actually
building anything
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19. Using a machine to layer different materials (plastic, metals) into different 
objects.  
20. 3D printing is the use of a special device which, given a coded 3D design 
and a base material, can create individual machine components. Usually 
the base material is some sort of powdered polymer resin, but more 
advanced printers can use a powdered titanium. 
21. Constructing objects via simple plastic first designed/rendered digitally  
22. Replicating three dimensional objects, usually produced with a plastic 
composite, from a digital file. The digital file is created by scanning a 
“real world” item. 
23. Melt plastic cording and deposit it in layers to build up a 3D shape that has 
been designed on a computer. 
24. You upload the specs of a 3D object and then a machine takes the material 
you’ve made available to it to then layer and affix the material in a 
programmed way, ultimately creating the desired object.  
25. Printing 3D plastic structures for miscellaneous use. 
26. This is building items using a printer-like machine with instructions 
provided by a digital design. 
27. Additive technique for constructing small volume models with a 3d CAD 
tool 
28. A plastic or metal object is built in its complete form, layer by layer, as 
opposed to fabricating pieces (by reduction from stock) and joining them. 
29. Using a machine and material, take a drawing/schematic from a file and 
have a computer printer create that item in real life layer by layer 
30. Geek method of manufacture at low rate of production and low quality.  
31. Instead of putting ink on paper, 3D printers carve or laser-cut an object out 
of often softer material (potentially any solid). Kind of like milling on 
metal, but without a massive industrial machine. 
32. converting a digital plan into a three dimensional object using a printer 
which uses the design to stacks/builds material into the planned object. 
33. Making an object through deposition of a material, usually controlled 
through a CAD program. 
34. 3D printing is a technology that is slowly making its way to the average 
consumer market. Most simply, it is a way of printing items one layer at a 
time out of the 3D printer’s supported material (many exist) until it is a 
finished three-dimensional object. 
35. 3D printing is a way to print tangible 3D objects from a computer-based 
3D image. 
36. Layers of material printed on top of layers 
37. Literally printing a figure that has been designed in 3-dimensional space 
using layers of materials. 
38. Printing an abstract object into the 3D plane via printer capable of that 
function 
39. Technology that creates a 3D replication based on a scan of an original 
object.  
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40. Able to print material such as parts or other simple objects. 
41. The ability to use a specialized printer to make items out of different 
materials.  
42. A manufacturing technology that takes a 3D schematic and “prints” it with 
some sort of medium, such as a plastic. 
43. Printing in 3d. can be lazer bonding or glue usually built in many many 
layers 
44. Use CAD software to design an item that you wish to print. Upload the 
CAD design to your 3D printer. 3D printer then builds the design by 
precisely laying down layers of plastic until he design is completed. 
45. Using a piece of machinery to recreate an object in a three dimensional 
form. 
46. Additive production technique utilizing material extruded onto a bed, 
usually in 3-axes. 
47. Additive manufacturing using computer code and software to develop 
physical objects.  
48. Rapid prototyping of designs in 3D space using plastics, powders, or 
metals. 
49. It is a computer controlled additive manufacturing process that deposits 
material (plastic or metal) in layers to build an object from a digital model 
of the object. 
50. Printing solid objects from a design file.  
51. A 3D object is created using a program that is compatible with the printer. 
Once completely designed, it will print on the 3D printer. Here at NPS, it 
is a plastic medium that is printed. It takes a while, but the final object is a 
3D object. The hope is to be able to use such printers (metal-type) 
eventually in the fleet to enable quick repairs. 
52. Recreating a physical 3D object from a virtual object, usually through 
some software application 
53. Printing 3D objects from CAD diagrams 
54. A manufacturing process where a computer model is sent to a printing 
system that adds layers up to form a artifact that may be otherwise 
impossible to create through traditional manufacturing processes. 
55. 3D printing is the manufacture of small-scale items using a printer head 
that can maneuver in a three dimensional plan and print composite 
material. 
56. A printer that can take a set of input plans and print something three 
dimensional, like a house (see Russian 3D house printer). 
57. 3D printing is an additive process where layers of a material are stacked 
on previous layers laid down based on a file. A common type is a printer 
that uses plastic filament to print out a 3D object by melting and forming 
the filament in layers on previous layers. 
58. A machine that creates an object from a base material. 
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59. An additive manufacturing technique that allows the user to define a 
model to be constructed in three dimensions using a computer aided 
design program. See the RoboDojo for more information. 
60. Printing 3D artifacts of various materials and purposes. 
61. Creating tangible objects from computer design 
62. create objects by designing on the computer and then printing by carving 
or pouring usually in polymer but other materials are possible. 
63. Using high-temperature malleable filaments to construct 3D models 
64. The ability to take a document, that electronically defines the edges and 
planes of an object, and use a specialized printer to create a copy of the 
object from the file. 
65. An additive manufacturing process that creates 3D objects. 
66. 3D printing is the ability to construct various objects from the ground up 
with different materials as opposed to construction through an assembly of 
parts.  
67. The ability to print basically anything that you can design into the 
software and have it print and be used. For example, printing an engine for 
a car. 
68. Using molten plastic/medium to create 3D objects based off digital input. 
2. USAF 
1. Equipment used to create inanimate objects and sometimes even food. 
2. The ability of a machine to create or sculpt a plastic (or other material) 3D 
object from an electronic representation of it. 
3. Printing that gives a dimensional look to give a more “life like” 
appearance 
4. A machine that uses coordinate based software such as CAD to build 
objects/shapes out of layered material 
5. Process where object is created in 3 dimensional printer via thin layers 
upon layers instead of cutting/hollowing out/molding a material to create 
an object. 
6. Creating a 3D (volume) object 
7. Image scan, followed by printing of that model using small plastic 
filaments—“builds up” 
8. It’s a printer that allows one to print in 3D and abstract. 
9. Printing technology that makes 3D functional products from a particular 
material 
10. Printer capable of producing 3D objects from a programmed specification. 
3. USA 
1. Using some sort of material extruded by a printer head to create an object 
2. Using computer software and compatible machinery to print 3D objects 
using a special made plastic either by designing a 3D object using 
software or by scanning it. 
156 
3. Using an automated system to build a device through a plan.
4. Additive manufacturing; squirting material together to form an object
rather than cutting excess away from a block.
5. Producing (printing) 3-dimensional objects given a data file, printing
device and a material to construct with.
6. Additive manufacturing. Creating something by adding layers of various
composites as opposed to removing material to generate the end product.
7. Creating a object by “printing” material in small amounts, controlled by a
computer model to create a total object.
8. Using a type of CAD software, a model is created whereby it is uploaded
to the 3D printer. The printer then uses a material (normally a plastic type)
to extrude material into layers that build up the design uploaded.
9. Upload a design and a “printer” cuts away on a block of plastic or other
material, in a 3D method.
B. FULL ANSWERS TO EXAMPLES FOR HOW “3D PRINTING CAN BE 
USEFUL FOR MY SERVICE,” LISTED BY SERVICE. 
1. USN
1. Small, low value, disposable and non-critical parts.
2. Printing parts on ships
3. I would need more information on the applications of the technology to
make a judgment call. Hypothetically any new technology can make a
service better, but what is the cost?
4. We already have a robust supply system. 3D printing probably doesn’t
meet design specs for a lot of military equipment. Maybe as a quick temp
fix, but limited value on a ship.
5. i’m sure there are some that can be built to meet operational
specifications...
6. Not sure what the application is.
7. Able to produce low-load replacement parts
8. Temporary parts for ships engineering department.
9. 3D printing will be useful for components with inconsistent failure rates
and in low-risk applications. For example, it would make no sense to use
3D printers to make items like gaskets, since these are designed to fail
over time, and a ready stockpile of them can be held onboard and utilized.
10. Parts needed for immediate repair. However, I would be concerned about
copyright issues.
11. Possibly improves morale by allowing sailors the opportunity to print
components for hobby projects.
12. It would require testing for suitability but parts or tools could of use.
13. Reduce needed parts inventory.
14. Depending on the material limitations, and specifications of the parts, it
could be used to “build” spare parts underway.
15. Parts for vehicles, aircraft, building models.
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16. 3D printing could provide a very limited supply capability for very 
specific types of materials. I’m thinking retainer packing, O-rings, etc. 
But, only for those applications where the material the printer uses is IAW 
the milspec of the part, and a failure of the part wouldn’t be catastrophic 
(ie I wouldn’t put it in an aviation system critical to flight) 
17. Parts, tools, etc. 
18. Temporary repair parts, tool manufacturing. 
19. printing replacement parts 
20. If ship parts could be printed, it would be useful. I think certifying the 
parts would be the hurdle to overcome.  
21. Gives the ability to fabricate and duplicate 
22. Parts repair underway 
23. Various small fasteners are commonly lost, many of which are “OEM”--
very difficult to find replacements for--these could be printed. Some 
companies are the sole producer of parts and when they go out of 
business/discontinue a line of product, we can no longer get repair parts--
many of these could be printed. Sailors are very innovative at finding 
solutions/betterments, but have no way to implement ideas--printers would 
give them a way to do that, increasing ownership and pride (which is 
sorely needed). 
24. Small parts replacement, engineering solutions where standard repair parts 
aren’t the answer 
25. May create a temporary repair part while at sea until full replacement parts 
become available. 
26. Spare Parts. Models. 
27. Maintenance 
28. Spare parts on demand 
29. Printing spare parts or not often used tools. 
30. Spare parts can be printed instead of stored.  
31. Parts for warfare platforms that are rare and infrequently used. 
32. Print replacement parts and tools that are unavailable.  
33. Spare part reproduction 
34. Printable replaceable parts for high fail items. Avoiding the stock system.  
35. spare parts 
36. Printing of parts to ensure material is on-hand JIT. 
37. If spare parts could be generated on a 3D printer it could save a lot of 
space on ships for easily replaceable parts. 
38. Tools onboard a ship 
39. Nuts, bolts, pipefittings 
40. Naval Deployed parts 
41. Manufacture of hard to procure, high failure rate items. Manufacture of 
custom items that otherwise would be unavailable for use in repairs. 
42. A high quality 3D printer could be used to print valve covers, fasteners 
and a variety of other material at sea. Being able to 3D print parts at sea 
would result in faster repair times. 
 158 
43. Supply parts, electronics, medical and healthcare, prototyping, production 
components 
44. Replacement tools, parts, etc 
45. Printing parts for systems while out to sea instead of waiting to pull into 
port and have a tech ready to bring the part. (This puts OPSEC in jeopardy 
in many situations.) 
46. Replacement parts, medical equipment not on hand, custom-made medical 
equipment 
47. Fabrication of small parts that take weeks/months to order a replacement: 
safety lanyards, unique screws, special tools, etc. 
48. Cost effective construction with immediate use.  
49. Ship parts, satellite parts, basically anything 
50. On ships we have false decking in many or our combat spaces. This 
decking is held down with plastic screws that always break and that is a hit 
on inspections. We could much more easily print them than have to order 
and stock them all the time. 
2. USAF 
1. A 3D printer can help the IT community by providing a way to replace 
small plastic items used to repair machines/telephones/racks.  
2. No use in the Contracting career field 
3. Checking the fit for a part before one is procured and manufactured 
4. Education, briefings, advertising  
5. Printing aircraft spare parts. Especially parts that are no longer in 
production. 
6. Modeling aerodynamics for fuselages, air foils... 
3. USA 
1. Emergency repair parts. 3D maps/terrain models 
2. Spare parts, terrain models, etc. 
3. Produce generic repair parts while deployed as opposed to shipping them 
overseas. However, the benefit would have to outweigh the costs. 
4. Only as it pertains to making parts for projects or small parts for vehicles, 
but I am unsure if the current technology supports that ability. 
5. Spare parts when deployed do not need to be shipped 
6. Small devices and parts are good but quality and economy of scale seem 
to limit the utility for now. 
7. I believe centrally controlled designs and processes for spare parts would 
be value added to the warfighter. It’s affect on defense acquisition is 
another story.  
8. Printing out parts for equipment or designing and creating accessories that 
can help improve current Soldier equipment. 
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C. FULL ANSWERS TO “WHAT PROBLEMS DO YOU SEE WITH 
RESPECT TO 3D PRINTING,” LISTED BY SERVICE. 
1. USN
1. Toughness of parts. Can they replace metal fasteners? what NDT or DT
requirements will the parts need to meet and can the ships do it them
selves onboard?
2. People using it fraudulently (wasting government supplies and funds) for
personal use.
3. It can be a huge time distraction when not being used for a specific
purpose.
4. Expense, stock system, material needs
5. Material viability for applications that require high strength or resistance
to wear.
6. Printed parts would not be always an option. 3D printer would be
underutilized and value not gained to the unit. Most likely only used in
emergency situation where OEM parts are not readily available.
7. Cost to implement
8. Availability of various materials required (mostly metals). Quality control.
Health issues with microparticles that are released especially with metal
usage.
9. The issue of testing and safety. Will the Navy test every single component
that can be 3D printed with every type of 3D printer to make sure that it
can be made safely? IF the Navy decides that would cost too much, how
much risk will operating have to assume in figuring it out? Further, what
are the costs of testing 3D printed parts and keeping electronic designs?
There are 2nd and 3rd order costs that we may not adequately understand
at the moment.
10. Are the printers compatible with computer systems available on ships
now? Who will conduct maintenance on the printers when they break and
a ship is at sea (will this add additional work to over-tasked maintenanced
WS’s? How will the parts be certified for use in critical CS or ENG
equipment. Who is going to train Sailors in proper use and maintenance on
the printers when installed? Will this require additional CINS/NEC’s and
what timeline will these classes be rolled out in support of printers?
11. It is very time consuming to make a single item.
12. How do you certify a 3D printed component meets the standards and
ensure that it is repeatable?
13. Durability, cost
14. Standardization & quality assurance.
15. The printer can always break and then you don’t have ANY parts.
16. Real world replication of weapons/explosive design components for
nefarious purposes.
17. Cost. Ability to perform on board ships. Copyright issues. Material used
that may be incompatible for the machine the item was printed for. The
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potentially unaware user that know the compatibility needs resulting in 
injury or death. Manpower specific to printing is not likely with fiscal 
constraints. Public perception will be wary that the military is using these 
for ‘toys’ and not intentional use.  
18. Not enough quality control, plastic not strong enough material for many 
applications, not practical 
19. Security, proper training, and efficiency.  
20. Structural integrity, high upkeep/maintenance, limited work-related (non-
recreational) usefulness. 
21. My biggest concern with 3D printing spare parts is that, any random part 
that we keep in stock meets unique specifications for use in specific 
systems, such as high temperature, tensile stress, etc. There may be 
hundreds of parts on a single system with different specifications for each 
part. There are thousands of systems on our ships. Using 3D printers will 
require many different types of base materials and the 3D printer would 
have to be rated to produce the highest quality materials consistently. In 
addition, there would have to be a method to QA those parts to ensure they 
are meeting those specifications. Lastly, if we rely on a 3D printer and it 
breaks, or the data is corrupted, or the computer component fails, it’s 
likely that we would not be able to support the ship’s material requirement 
until a contractor flew out to fix the printer. 
22. Verification and Validation. Ensure the current print is what was intended, 
ensure this medium meets stress models 
23. Certifying the printed parts for aircraft use will be troublesome. 
24. Possibly quality control and tracking 
25. Reliability of the printed products under harsh conditions.  
26. Ensuring a level surface in an at sea environment conducive for printing 
27. Allotting time and materials so all divisions have a chance to use it. I can 
see it becoming a political game easily. Also not sure how easy supplies 
are to get/ship (any hazmat, etc?), or what type of maintenance is 
associated with them. And I don’t know how stable the printer needs to be 
in order to print (can it be done in heavier seas? do we need to be in port? 
etc.). Would also need to ensure we have all of the correct materials--
specifically types of metal. Printing a fastener in the wrong metal because 
it’s cheaper/more available may cause bi-metallic or other corrosion issues 
in places it wouldn’t otherwise be. Lastly, knowing how the Navy works, I 
can see people printing items to ‘cover up’ issues as opposed to actually 
fixing them correctly. Perception is reality, so some people will want to 
hide major issues with a nice shiny printed cover that perhaps INSURV 
won’t look underneath...  
28. Quality control of manufactured items 
29. The total life cycle cost of owning, operating, maintaining, training, and 
disposal will not be properly researched before purchases are made.  
30. Not reliable. Not consistent. Weak when compared to cast or machined 
parts. Different printers produce very different products with the same 
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supply material. Limited in scale and accuracy. Limited in moldability and 
finish options.  
31. Durability/strength of the printed product. Cost compared to traditional 
manufacturing.  
32. Durability, reliability, meeting operational specifications. 
33. Printed parts not working as required. 
34. Maintenance issues, proper functionality while on a boat (rolling), being 
used for personal reasons 
35. Maintaining a stock of the composite material needed by the 3D printer. 
36. Strength of the composite material once printed as comparable to 
traditional materials (aluminum, stainless steel, etc.) 
37. Precision parts printing may not be cost effective. If a precision printer 
costs $250,000, and only prints precision fasteners that cost $1.00 a piece, 
through the life of a ship 250,000 new fasteners may never be needed. 
38. Using it responsibly and not wasting material. Many commands have an 
issue with ink for printers. It will be even worse for 3D printers. 
39. Very expensive 
40. Cost, interfacing to the Shipmain process, 3d material properties not to 
spec for replacement part.  
41. Current fidelity of printed artifacts, business process integration, 
interfacing, durability in tactical environments 
42. Consistency 
43. Computer Design capability of Sailors 
44. Build quality, issues with temperature/humidity tolerance, proficiency 
45. I have only heard the slightest mention of ideas on how these could be 
used. I have never seen anything scholarly to support high-quality parts 
coming out of a 3D printer in some industrial grade metal 
meeting/exceeding milspec. 
46. So: what is the best quality these machines are capable of? With what 
materials and to what tolerances? what about composite parts like 
electronic circuitry? 
47. Logistics in the Navy is a nightmare we are always behind the curve. The 
Navy is three years into an update to mitigate a critical information system 
vulnerability, THREE YEARS! 
48. Cyber security. Integration into ShipMain. How qualify parts as safe with 
and without a DFS. 
49. Funding, rules/requirements surrounding, maintenance specifications for 
printer itself and materials produced, bureaucracy 
50. Waste from lack of training; abuse of printer for fun 
51. Time 
52. Materials needed 
53. Ease to acquire thing that is supposed to be printed 
54. Expensive and not necessary for every work center.  
55. Biggest problem: lack of approval for use of 3D printer created items in 
systems. Availability of resources and materials.  
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56. I don’t know enough about 3D printing to answer intelligently.  
57. No idea. 
58. The concern would be the durability of things made from 3D printing. 
Would the material required to print offset the space and energy cost of 
making tools? My guess is it would. 
59. Slow, difficult to create plans for objects. Does not meet MILSPEC. 
60. Materiel 
61. High cost of equipment, maintenance, training, etc.  
62. The applicability of 3D printing to ordinary users and general 
awareness/education of 3D printing.  
63. As 3D printing can be helpful to us it is also technology and research that 
can be stolen by our enemies to use against the U.S. in future conflict.  
64. Not very timely 
65. Cost, risk of failure, maintenance costs 
66. People overestimating the capabilities that 3D printing can bring while it’s 
still an immature technology. If people assume a more robust capability 
than actually exists, it could lead to neglecting important planning for 
reliability of systems and logistics support to operational unit.  




1. Printing of contraband. 
2. Cost and maintenance  
3. Cost 
4. It’s expensive technology at this time. The benefits may not outweigh cost 
yet. 
5. Costs and understanding of how to use it and maintenance  
6. Not sure it can be used to produce military grade parts 
7. Form, fit, function, reliability, utility, survivability, sustainability 
8. Economic impacts of small batch production on large scale producers 
3. USA 
1. Time to print objects, ruggedness of the printers (don’t think they are 
deployable and can stand up to a muddy/dusty/wet environment 
2. The material being strong enough to stand up to demands and the time it 
takes to print something. 
3. Training will take too long, cost vs benefit may not be good enough yet, 
abuse by service-members.  
4. Today and fundamentally: costs versus other forms of manufacturing. 
5. Tomorrow and ethically: ability to create weapons that are not 
controlled/regulated. 
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6. You can’t print a market quality microchip in the field; even if you could, 
it would come out ‘dumb’ w/o necessary software for the application. I 
still have to haul the weight of the material of the thing I’d make. It also 
still takes so long to pump out a piece. I’m SURE it will be useful, at 
scale, in 5–10 years; but right now its a mild disruptor, not a war winner. 
7. Quality control and failure of spare parts not manufactured to the original 
design.  
8. Using the wrong type of material for creating parts or overestimating the 
strength/durability of printed parts. There are limitations for certain 
designs and the type of material used that can be easily overlooked by an 
average Soldier. 
9. That many things that could be printed are made of a mix of materials, so 
how do you “print” it up with different materials in different locations? 
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